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Abstract 
 
Using bootstrap panel analysis, allowing for cross-country correlation, without the 
need of pre-testing for unit roots, we study the causality between government revenue 
and spending for the EU in the period 1960-2006. Spend-and-tax causality is found 
for Italy, France, Spain, Greece, and Portugal, while tax-and-spend evidence is 
present for Germany, Belgium, Austria, Finland and the UK, and for several EU New 
Member States. 
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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
Fiscal sustainability studies usually assess the existence of a long-term cointegration 
relationship between government revenue and spending. Nevertheless, an important 
feature linked to the existence of such cointegration relation is the direction of 
causality between spending and revenue, which conveys how fiscal policy is set-up in 
practice. Indeed, one may have one-way Granger-causality from spending (revenue) 
to revenue (spending), i.e. “tax-and-spend” (“spend-and-tax”) causality, two-way 
causality or no Granger-causality between revenue and spending. 
 
The literature essentially assesses the existence of causality in a single country set-up. 
However, there is economic rational for undertaking a panel approach, taking 
advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques. In the European 
Union (EU), and even if there is no single fiscal policy in place, panel analysis is 
relevant in the context of countries seeking to pursue sound fiscal policies within the 
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cross-country dependence can be 
envisaged in the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), via peer pressure 
or via integrated financial markets. Moreover, cross-country spillovers in government 
bond markets are to be expected, and interest rates comovements inside the EU have 
also gradually become more noticeable. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature with a bootstrap panel analysis of causality 
between government revenue and spending in the EU country set, to assess which 
countries are characterised by a tax-and-spend or by a spend-and-tax behaviour during 
the period 1960-2006. 
The results support the so-called spend-and-tax causality for such countries as Italy, 
France, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. Tax-and-spend evidence is present notably for   3
Germany, Belgium, Austria Finland and the UK, and also for several EU New 
Member States. Some shifting regarding the direction of the causality patterns can 
also be detected, after the 2
nd half of the 1980s, which may imply adjustments of 
fiscal behaviour in the run-up to EMU. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal sustainability studies usually assess the existence of a long-term 
cointegration relationship between government revenue and spending.
1 Nevertheless, 
an important feature linked to the existence of such cointegration relation is the 
direction of causality between spending and revenue, which conveys how fiscal policy 
is set-up in practice. Indeed, one may have one-way Granger-causality from spending 
(revenue) to revenue (spending), i.e. “tax-and-spend” (“spend-and-tax”) causality, 
two-way causality or no Granger-causality between revenue and spending. 
The literature essentially assesses the existence of causality in a single country 
set-up.
2 However, there is economic rational for undertaking a panel approach, taking 
advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques. In the European 
Union (EU), and even if there is no single fiscal policy in place, panel analysis is 
relevant in the context of countries seeking to pursue sound fiscal policies within the 
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cross-country dependence can be 
envisaged in the run-up to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), via peer pressure 
or via integrated financial markets. Moreover, cross-country spillovers in government 
bond markets are to be expected, and interest rates comovements inside the EU have 
also gradually become more noticeable.  
This paper contributes to the literature with a bootstrap panel analysis of 
causality between government revenue and spending in the EU country set, to assess 
which countries are characterised by a tax-and-spend or by a spend-and-tax behaviour 
during the period 1960-2006. Section two explains the methodology, section three 
reports the empirical analysis and section four concludes. 
                                                 
1 Afonso (2005) explains the relevant linkages and reviews the empirical evidence. Afonso and Rault 
(2007) test the cointegration relationship with panel unit root and cointegration tests, allowing for 
correlation within and between units. 
2 See, for instance, von Fursternberg et al. (1986), Chang et al. (2002), Payne (2004), and Kollias and 
Paleologou (2006).   5
2. Series specific panel Granger causality test methodology 
We use the panel data approach developed by Kónya (2006), based on a 
bivariate finite-order vector autoregressive model, and we apply it in our context to 
general government revenue, R, and spending, G:
 3 
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where the index i () N i ,..., 1 =  denotes the country, the index t ( ) T t ,..., 1 =  the period, j 
the lag, and p1i, p2i and p3i, indicate the longest lags in the system. The error terms, 
1, , it ε  and  2, , it ε , are supposed to be white-noises (i.e. they have zero means, constant 
variances and are individually serially uncorrelated) and may be correlated with each 
other for a given country, but not across countries. 
System (1) is estimated by the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) 
procedure, since possible links may exist among individual regressions via 
contemporaneous correlation
4 within the two equations. Wald tests for Granger 
causality are performed with country specific bootstrap critical values generated by 
simulations.  
With respect to system (1), in country i there is one-way Granger-causality 
from G to R if in the first equation not all 1,i γ are zero but in the second all 2,i β are zero; 
there is one-way Granger-causality from R to G if in the first equation all  1,i γ are zero 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to L. Kónya for providing his TSP codes, which we have adapted for our analysis. 
4 This assumption is very likely to be relevant for many macroeconomic time series for EU countries 
for which strong economic links exist.   6
but in the second not all  2,i β are zero; there is two-way Granger-causality between R 
to G if neither all  2,i β nor all  1,i γ are zero; and there is no Granger-causality between R 
to G if all  2,i β and  1,i γ are zero.
5  
This procedure has several advantages. Firstly, it does not assume that the 
panel is homogeneous, being possible to test for Granger-causality on each individual 
panel member separately. However, since contemporaneous correlation is allowed 
across countries, it makes possible to exploit the extra information provided by the 
panel data setting. Secondly, it does not require pre-testing for unit roots and 
cointegration (since country specific bootstrap critical values are generated), though it 
still requires the specification of the lag structure. This is an important feature since 
the unit-root and cointegration tests in general suffer from low power, and different 
tests often lead to contradictory outcomes. Thirdly, this approach allows detecting for 
how many and for which members of the panel there exists one-way, two-way, or no 
Granger-causality. 
3. Econometric investigation 
Data for general government expenditure and revenue are taken from the 
European Commission AMECO database.
6 The data cover the periods 1960-2006 for 
the EU15 countries, and 1998-2006 for the EU25 countries and the unbalanced panels 
are used for the SUR analysis and Granger-causality testing.
7 
8 
                                                 
5 As stressed by Kónya (2006) this definition implies causality for one period ahead. 
6 The AMECO codes are as follows: total expenditure (% of GDP), .1.0.319.0.UUTGE, 
.1.0.319.0.UUTGF; total revenue (% of GDP), .1.0.319.0.URTG, .1.0.319.0.URTGF. 
7 EU15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and Sweden. EU25: EU15, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
8 For the SUR approach to work properly, the time series dimension should be substantially larger than 
N, a condition that is only fulfilled for the EU25 over the 1998-2006 period. Therefore, for the EU25 
panels the SUR estimation is performed on the (unbalanced) 1970-2006 period.   7
We use government spending and revenue data as a ratio of GDP. Apart form 
the fact that ratios of nominal magnitudes are commonly used in the international 
debate, it is also important to scale the variables for the panel approach. In addition, 
the bootstrap causality test that we use does not require unit root testing. 
Table 1 shows the results of the causality tests for the EU15 panel for the 
period 1960-2006. It is possible to observe that while government revenue positively 
causes government spending for Germany and negatively for Ireland, there are more 
cases pointing to the spend-and-tax hypothesis: Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
and Sweden.  
Table 1a – Causality from government revenue to spending, EU15 (1960-2006) 
 
Bootstrap critical values   Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1% 5%  10% 
Austria   0.1351    1.2361  26.5043 15.5115 11.5606 
Belgium    0.0183    0.0600  21.6994 12.7869 8.60072 
Denmark  -0.0238   0.1362  24.1007 13.7943 9.80305 
Finland    0.1050    1.6209  21.8583 13.4235 10.4536 
France  -0.0119   0.0153  33.3617 23.3719 16.5679 
Germany    0.4409    28.130***  23.0660 14.5004 9.82668 
Greece  -0.0986   1.5955  27.2009 16.9224 12.2377 
Ireland  -0.2049   11.572*  22.1834 12.5130 9.63277 
Italy    0.0003    0.0004  21.0231 16.4763 12.2038 
Luxembourg   0.2337    6.8957  21.7075 12.2952 9.19950 
Netherlands    0.1453    1.9476  21.0882 13.4699 9.83869 
Portugal    0.1810    7.7905  29.4152 20.8129 16.4777 
Spain  -0.0867   2.4448  32.6605 23.7844 17.7405 
Sweden    0.0281    0.1175  25.0536 15.5121 10.4427 
UK    0.1628    3.6575  17.4399 9.79579 7.52149 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
H0: R does not cause G. 
 
Table 1b – Causality from government spending to revenue, EU15 (1960-2006)  
 
Bootstrap critical values   Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1% 5%  10% 
Austria   0.2290    8.2731*  22.2499 11.1867 7.9895 
Belgium    0.0052    0.0266  18.3643 10.5409 7.73236 
Denmark    0.1307    3.9247  23.6322 12.5703 9.37391 
Finland    0.0632    1.1145  18.9469 13.1284 9.68753 
France    0.3230    25.450***  19.3738 14.0002 10.7197 
Germany    0.1468    5.0713  18.5037 11.7241 8.79791 
Greece    0.1043    12.325*  28.6306 16.7483 11.6541 
Ireland    0.0988    6.3321  29.5567 12.8465 8.51660 
Italy    0.1363    17.783**  27.4934 16.1808 11.8194 
Luxembourg    0.0806    0.7435  20.2061 11.3574 8.39400   8
Netherlands   0.0871    0.9737  19.4031 11.6964 8.71781 
Portugal    0.1075    4.9057  26.1445 15.9634 13.1014 
Spain    0.1340    10.590*  17.4415 11.5850 8.50721 
Sweden    0.1285    8.1168*  15.9548 10.9160 7.76927 
UK  -0.0434    0.3727  20.3780 10.9510 6.97039 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
H0: G does not cause R. 
 
We also compared the results (not shown) for two sub-periods, 1960-1985 and 
1986-2006. In the first sub-period, causality from revenue to spending occurs in six 
countries, while causality from spending to revenue is detected for Greece, Italy and 
Portugal. In addition, the tax-and-spend result is obtained for Portugal in the second 
sub-period while a negative causality from revenue to spending is found for Italy and 
Belgium, which may signal increased concerns regarding fiscal behaviour in the run-
up to EMU. On the other hand, the spend-and-tax result occurs in the second sub-
period for France and Ireland. 
Table 2 reports the results for the EU25 country sample, considering most of 
the EU New Member States (NMS). The spend-and-tax result is still found for 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy, and Spain, and causality still runs from revenue to 
spending in the case of Germany and Luxembourg. On the other hand, the evidence 
shows causality from revenue to spending in several EU New Members States: Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland. Finally, two countries exhibit two-way, bi-
directional causality between government revenue and spending: Ireland and 
Slovakia. Table 3 summarises the causality results. 
 
Table 2a – Causality from government revenue to spending, EU25 (1960-2006, 1998-
2006 for NMS) 
 
Bootstrap critical values   Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1% 5%  10% 
Austria   0.2009      3.6305  41.2461 23.1395 16.6998 
Belgium  -0.0010   0.0020  32.2159 17.9067 13.2455 
Bulgaria    2.1296    1.9209  72.7410 18.1467 10.6635 
Czech Republic   1.1902    117.58***  60.7540 22.8137 16.6407 
Denmark  -0.0645   1.3795  41.9757 22.3520 16.6643   9
Estonia    0.5861    116.77***  72.8279 24.2003 16.6886 
Finland    0.1707    6.4720  46.0596 26.9281 20.8231 
France    0.0676    0.7831  43.3779 24.2287 19.8115 
Germany    0.4764    47.753***  34.4426 23.1298 15.8835 
Greece  -0.1240   3.3001  29.8829 19.4335 14.3818 
Hungary    1.3929    13.215  133.850 33.8927 22.9206 
Ireland  -0.1863   10.846*  32.9529 16.8088 9.91600 
Italy  -0.0093   0.0406  40.0782 24.0417 18.1905 
Lithuania    0.7834    71.052***  45.0261 25.1628 17.2383 
Luxembourg   0.2527    11.364*  36.1252 17.8449 10.5813 
Latvia  -0.2954   0.8001  72.6016 26.0319 18.1718 
Malta    0.1944    0.0612  66.7247 27.0500 18.7337 
Netherlands    0.0917    1.1335  40.9455 20.3194 14.3195 
Poland    0.7741    16.350*  75.7026 29.3214 16.1523 
Portugal    0.1771    9.9942  66.3728 34.3644 24.1508 
Spain  -0.0987   3.6759  50.0771 32.0511 26.2648 
Slovakia    0.8231    91.575***  47.1513 18.5281 12.4573 
Slovenia    1.3726    0.9320  66.6083 25.8891 17.3368 
Sweden    0.0286    0.1586  34.9508 18.8386 13.6560 
UK    0.2061    6.7309  27.4755 14.3481 10.2508 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
H0: R does not cause G. 
 
 
Table 2b – Causality from government spending to revenue, EU25 (1960-2006, 1998-
2006, for NMS) 
 
Bootstrap critical values   Estimated 
coefficient 
Test Statistic 
     1% 5%  10% 
Austria   0.2529      12.044*  19.5303 13.4184 10.2562 
Belgium    0.0224   0.54781  19.5653 13.9294 10.8562 
Bulgaria    1.6730   1.04981  42.6198 25.0232 10.3543 
Czech  Republic  -0.0349   0.41078  71.0631 41.1924 28.0181 
Denmark    0.1089   3.27944  26.2961 19.5282 14.9182 
Estonia  -0.0841   2.03649  72.0515 39.0268 28.0185 
Finland    0.0329   0.42829  21.5672 13.2089 10.1670 
France    0.2434   18.0268**  21.3095 13.3523 10.4775 
Germany    0.0991   3.13249  20.9963 14.3719 10.3984 
Greece    0.1141   19.9956*  28.9023 21.6341 17.0258 
Hungary  -0.3327   0.57414  51.9562 29.3867 18.4169 
Ireland    0.1169   9.55691*  19.7658 12.5920 9.21358 
Italy    0.1159   16.4259**  22.1347 15.3167 11.6779 
Lithuania  -0.0018   0.00152  69.7456 45.8297 29.9929 
Luxembourg    0.0927   1.18539  21.8078 13.8562 10.6759 
Latvia    0.3720   0.78022  32.1787 21.9743 16.1741 
Malta    0.1615   0.09375  28.1466 17.6842 10.9345 
Netherlands   0.0557   0.48933  20.5256 14.6298 12.2631 
Poland  -0.4814   6.97142  75.3512 40.3326 28.0697 
Portugal    0.1048   7.61307  30.8244 20.4392 15.4292 
Spain    0.1273   12.0118*  25.0689 17.7928 11.3755 
Slovakia    0.1732   40.8910**  67.3608 36.4847 29.9371 
Slovenia    0.0828   0.00149  41.5854 23.4056 14.1824 
Sweden    0.1010   6.42458  18.9381 12.8071 9.37407 
UK  -0.0523   0.63520  18.1513 11.5070 8.34389 
***, **, *: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
H0: G does not cause R. 
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Table 3 – Summary of results 
 
Revenue ⇒ Spending   
Panel  ∆ R ⇒ ∆ G 
(tax-and-spend) 
∆ R⇒∇G 
Spending ⇒ Revenue 
(spend-and-tax) 
EU15, 1960-2006  Germany  Ireland  Austria, Italy, France, 
Spain, Greece, Sweden 
EU15, 1960-1985  Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden, 
Luxembourg, UK 
  Greece, Italy, Portugal 
EU15, 1986-2006  Austria, Finland, 
Portugal  
Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy, Sweden 
France, Ireland 
EU25, 1960-2006; 
NMS, 1998-2006 
Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia 
Germany, 
Luxembourg 
Ireland Slovakia,  Austria,  France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain 
   
  
4. Conclusion 
  We used a bootstrap panel analysis of causality between government revenue 
and spending for the EU, which allows for contemporaneous correlation across 
countries and dispenses the need of pre-testing for unit roots. The results support the 
so-called spend-and-tax causality for such countries as Italy, France, Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal. Tax-and-spend evidence is present notably for Germany, Belgium, 
Austria Finland and the UK, and also for several EU New Member States. Some 
shifting regarding the direction of the causality patterns can also be detected, after the 
2
nd half of the 1980s, which may imply adjustments of fiscal behaviour in the run-up 
to EMU. 
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